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In this paper, we analyse the relationship between money and inflation in a 
small open economy where domestic and foreign currencies are perfect substitutes 
as means of payment. It is shown that, if the path of domestic money supply is such 
that individuals find it optimal to change the currency in which transactions are 
settled, there will be an adjustment period during which domestic inflation adjusts so 
as to equalise the foreign inflation rate. In the case of a disinflation program, it is 
shown that the foreign currency is not necessarily abandoned as means of payment. 
The results obtained are consistent with both dollarisation hysteresis and 
reversibility, without requiring the specification of dollarisation costs.  
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1. Introduction 
In high inflation countries, the rapid erosion of the value of domestic currency 
leads agents to substitute it by foreign currency in either any or all of the basic 
functions of money. This phenomenon is usually called currency substitution, or 
simply dollarisation, and is a matter of concern for policymakers, as it constrains 
their ability to implement economic policy. In particular, it aggravates the 
inflationary consequences of seigniorage and reduces the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, even under flexible exchange rates (for a literature review, see Giovannini 
and Turtelboom, 1992). 
A fact that is hard to explain by conventional money demand theories is that 
dollarisation exhibits a persistent behaviour unrelated to either current inflation or 
interest rate differentials. In some countries the implementation of successful anti-
inflation programmes was not enough to bring down sharply the demand for dollars 
(evidence of dollarisation hysteresis was presented by Guidotti and Rodriguez, 1992, 
for Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, by Kamin and Ericsson, 1993, for Argentina, 
by Clements and Schwartz, 1993, for Bolivia, by Mueller, 1994, for Lebanon). 
However, in some other countries, dollarisation was easier to reverse (reversibility 
patterns were identified in Egypt, Yemen and Chile, by Mueller, 1994, and in some 
transition countries in East Europe, by Sahay and Végh, 1996). 2 
 
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon, using a 
small open economy model where domestic and foreign currencies are perfect 
substitutes as means of payment. The assumption of perfect means of payment 
substitutability (PMS) was previously discussed by Kareken and Wallace (1981) for 
the case of international currencies, but it has been increasingly used in models 
analysing the phenomenon of dollarisation hysteresis in less developed countries 
(e.g., Guidotti and Rodriguez, 1992, Uribe, 1997, and Reding and Morales, 1999). 
Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) proposed a PMS model with switching costs, that is 
costs associated to the change of the dollarisation level. These costs result in an 
inflation band within which agents choose not to switch between currencies. Hence, 
de-dollarisation may only be achieved if the domestic inflation decreases enough to 
offset the de-dollarisation costs. The PMS model was extended by Uribe (1997) and 
Reding and Morales (1999), who stressed the role of network economies, instead of 
switching costs, as the source of non-linearities in the relationship between the 
money demand and inflation.  
A limitation of Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992), Uribe (1997) and Reding and 
Morales (1999) is that the inflation rate was assumed exogenous, instead of 
depending on the money demand. To the extent that changes in the aggregate money 
demand impact on the inflation rate, the dynamic analysis made by these authors 
may be misleading. This paper extends the PMS model by allowing the inflation rate 
to be determined by money demand and supply and by then exploring the implied 
short-term dynamics. The results obtained are consistent with the evidence of both 
dollarisation hysteresis and reversibility, as described in the literature, without the 3 
 
need to introduce dollarisation costs. The model differs from that of Kareken and 
Wallace (1981) because foreign residents are not allowed to hold the domestic 
currency (only asymmetric currency substitution is considered) and there is a 
minimum constraint on the amount of domestic money holdings. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model. In 
Section 3, we discuss the dynamics of inflation and currency substitution. In Section 
4 we discuss the indeterminacy associated to a disinflation programme. Conclusions 
are presented in Section 5.  
2. The model 
Consider a small open economy that operates under flexible exchange rates and 
perfect capital mobility. Transactions may be carried out by using both domestic and 
foreign money, the two currencies being perfect substitutes. The economy is 
inhabited by a fixed number N of atomistic individuals who are blessed with perfect 
foresight and infinite life. Foreign residents do not hold domestic money balances. 
There exists only one international indexed bond and one consumption good. There 
are neither impediments to trade nor transport costs, so that purchasing power parity 
holds instantaneously. Time is continuous and in each instant individuals receive a 
fixed real income and a government transfer. Individuals maximise their lifetime 
utility function subject to a wealth constraint. Seigniorage is the only source of 
government revenues and a balanced budget is imposed each period. Foreign 4 
 
seigniorage revenues are appropriated by the foreign country, so that a trade surplus 
occurs when domestic residents hold foreign money balances. The complete set-up 
of the model is presented in Appendix 1.  
The consumption good may be either purchased with P units of domestic 
currency (M) or P*  units of foreign currency (F). The liquidity constraint requires 
purchases to be made with money held at the time of the transaction and broad 
money velocity is set equal to one. Although individuals are allowed to hold cash in 
excess of their purchasing needs, as long as they have perfect foresight and an 
interest-bearing asset dominates money, the cash-in-advance constraint holds as 
equality1:   
t t t c f m = + ,                                                                                                  (1) 
where  t t t NP M m =  and 
*
t t t NP F f =  are the home country per capita holdings of 
domestic and foreign real money balances and  t c  is the per capita real consumption.  
To capture the existence of institutional limits to dollarisation (e.g., 
transactions involving the government or closely monitored by it, which cannot be 
                                                 
1 Note that, in terms of the timing of transactions, this cash-in-advance constraint is not 
equivalent to those of the discrete time models. In continuous time, it is impossible to distinguish 
between moments in which money is held by consumers from moments in which money is held by 
firms. Each instant, individuals have to carry an amount of cash equal to their consumption needs and 
there is no way of avoiding the wealth erosion caused by the inflation taxes. At most, individuals are 
able to change the currency composition of their cash holdings. 5 
 
settled in the foreign currency2), it will be assumed that the amount of transactions 
carried out with domestic currency cannot fall below a minimum level, m . This 
assumption, together with (1) and the observation that it does not pay to be short on 
the foreign currency, implies:  
[] t t c m m , ∈ .                                                                                                  (2) 
With the usual assumption that the rate of time preference is equal to the real 
interest rate on the indexed bond, the optimal consumption becomes constant over 
time. Thus, without loss of generality we can normalise it to unity, so as to interpret 
m as a proportion. Given the liquidity constraint (1) and the assumption of perfect 




















mt ,                                                                               (3) 
where  t t t P P & = π  and π tt t PP
* ** & = . This is a common arbitrage condition, stating 
that the domestic currency holdings of a representative individual will be 
respectively 1, any allowed amount or m , as the domestic inflation is lower, equal or 
higher than the foreign inflation rate. An implication is that, for any currency 
substitution to occur in this model, the domestic and foreign inflation rates must be 
                                                 
2 Stubbornness of domestic money was observed, even during extremely high inflation rates, 
such as the German hyperinflation (Giovannini and Turtelboom, 1994).   6 
 
equal, because only in that case will individuals hold a positive amount of both 
currencies. 
Assuming that the nominal money supply is a continuous function of time, 
given by µtt t MM = & , the real money stock evolves according to: 
() t t t t m m π µ− = & .                                                                                          (4) 
The equilibrium paths of inflation and real money balances may be defined in 
the following way:  
Definition 1 (equilibrium). A money market equilibrium in this model is given by a 
time continuous function  t m  for the representative consumer, and a function  t π  for 
the whole economy, such that, given the nominal rate of money growth  t µ , the per 
capita real money stock (4) is consistent with individual money demands (3). 
In Definition 1, not only instantaneous money market equilibrium is required, 
but also continuity of the real value of domestic money balances over time. This is 
because the nominal money supply is time continuous and jumps in the price level 
are rule out by the assumptions of perfect foresight and no arbitrage opportunities. 
From (1), the demand for foreign currency is given by  fm tt =− 1 .  
Note that, when agents decide upon their cash holdings, they take the inflation 
path as given, because individually they cannot change the price level. Due to the 
small country assumption, the domestic demand for foreign currency does not affect 
the foreign rate of inflation.  7 
 
In the following discussion, it will be useful to take as a benchmark the trivial 
solutions corresponding to time-invariant paths of µ.  
Definition 2 (trivial solutions). When µ is time-invariant, the equilibrium path of m 
is: (i)
* π µ> = if m mt ; (ii)
* 1 π µ< = if mt ; (iii)mm t =  for any m ≤ ≤ m 1 
if µπ =
*.  
To see this, we first note that any path with  0 ≠ m &  cannot be an equilibrium. 
Indeed, given the money demand (3), any non-horizontal path of m would only be 
possible if 
* π π= . However, this cannot happen in case (iii) – because the equality 
of inflation rates requires an horizontal money demand path - or in case (i) [(ii)], in 
which this would require the money demand to grow [decline] exponentially forever, 
and bubbles are ruled out by (2). Hence, only horizontal money demand paths are 
allowed, and in these cases we know by (4) that the domestic inflation rate is equal to 
the rate of money creation.  
Note that, in cases (i) and (ii) individual optimisation prevents individuals from 
abandoning their horizontal money demand paths, whereas in case (iii) any level of 
m is optimal from the individual point of view. In this case the two currencies are 
perfect substitutes both on the demand and the supply side and the price level 
becomes undetermined, as in Kareken and Wallace (1981). However, only horizontal 
paths of m  are equilibria, because otherwise domestic and foreign inflation rates 
would not be equal, causing the existing stock of cash holdings to be inconsistent 
with individual money demands.  8 
 
3. The dynamics of inflation and currency substitution 
In this section we explore the adjustment dynamics of the model when the 
money supply path is such that individuals find it optimal to alter their cash-
holdings.  
Proposition 1 (the dynamics of inflation and currency substitution). If the domestic 
rate of money growth increases linearly over time, according to 
0 , > + =σ σ µ µ with t t  and 







































































ln 2 ~ −
− = .  
Proof: See Appendix 2.  
To interpret Proposition 1 we refer to Figure 1. We depict in the bottom 
diagram the inflation rate and the rate of money growth and in the upper diagram the 9 
 
money demand. Given the path of inflation, (6), individuals decide to use only 
domestic currency in the first segment and the maximum allowed level of foreign 
currency in the third segment. In the intermediate segment, individuals are adjusting 
their cash holdings between these two corner solutions. Since this requires a 
reduction in real money balances, the domestic inflation rate rises relative to the rate 
of money creation, µ. For this adjustment path to be equilibrium, however, domestic 
and foreign inflation rates must be equal, because only in this case will individuals 
accept to hold a positive amount of both currencies. If the aggregate money demand 
declined slower or faster, the inflation differential would not be zero, and no 
continuous path, such that individual money demands and supply were continuously 
satisfied, could be found.  
An interesting property of this equilibrium is that individuals have to wait for 
the right moment to start adjusting their cash holdings. This property results from the 
existence of an upper limit in the individual cash holdings. In general, observing the 
partial derivatives of % t  with respect to the relevant parameters, the following 
corollary holds:  
Corollary  1 (on the timing of the inflation adjustment). Under the conditions of 
Proposition 1, the domestic inflation adjusts earlier: (a) the lower the foreign 
inflation rate; (b) the higher the autonomous money growth, µ; (c) the lower the 
minimum allowed proportion of domestic money balances, m .  The time dependent 
term of the money growth rule, σ, has an ambiguous effect on the timing of the 
inflation adjustment. 10 
 
Lines (a) and (b) say that, the earlier the moment t  (when the currency 
substitution process is complete), the earlier agents will start adjusting their cash 
holdings, for a given adjustment speed. Line (c) says that the greater the size of the 
allowed currency substitution, the sooner the adjustment starts. According to this, as 
m  approaches zero, t ~  moves backward, because more time is necessary to switch 
between currencies. In the limit case in which the minimum allowed amount of cash 
holdings is zero, actual holdings will be zero from time minus infinity, because 
agents know that at moment t  the domestic currency will not have any value. 
Finally, the time dependent term of the money growth rule affects both moment t  
and the speed of the adjustment process, so that it has an ambiguous effect on the 
timing of the inflation overshooting. 
Corollary 2 (on the length of the adjustment period). Under the conditions of 
Proposition 1, the length of the adjustment period, l =− tt % is: (a) unaffected by the 
difference  ( ) µ π −
* ; (b) larger, the lower the minimum allowed proportion of 
domestic balances, m ; (c) larger, the lower the rate of monetary expansion, σ.  
These results follow straightforwardly from the partial derivatives of 
()
2 1 ln 2 σ m − = l  with respect to the relevant parameters. Line (a) says that, 
although different levels of µ and π
* affect the absolute position of t , they do not 
change the length of the adjustment period. Line (b) says that the length of the 
adjustment period depends on the allowed level of currency substitution. When 
m =1, there is no place for currency substitution, so that the length of the adjustment 
period is zero. As m  approaches zero, % t  moves backward (relative to t ), as more 
Field Code Changed11 
 
time is necessary to adjust the cash holdings. Although the rate of monetary 
expansion has an ambiguous effect on the absolute timing of the overshooting 
(Corollary 1) line (c) of Corollary 2 says that the overshooting starts earlier relative 
to moment t , the lower the rate of money growth. 
4. The dynamics of a disinflation programme 
To investigate the dynamics of a disinflation programme, assume that initially 
the domestic inflation rate is higher than the foreign inflation rate and that 
individuals start holding mm = . The anti-inflation programme consists reducing the 
rate of domestic money growth until it reaches the foreign inflation rate, remaining at 
this level thereafter. When this is so, the following proposition holds:  
Proposition 2 (the dynamics of a disinflation programme). If the domestic nominal 
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π ,                                                                        (8) 




ln 2 ~ −
− = . 
Proof: Same as Proposition 1, except that in this case any level of m is 
equilibrium after t .   
This case has multiple equilibria because after the disinflation programme the 
two currencies become perfect substitutes on the supply side, as in the flat 
equilibrium (iii) of Definition 2. Hence, there is an adjustment path for each allowed 
level of dollarisation in the new steady state.  
To illustrate Proposition 2 we refer to Figure 2. In panel (a) we depict two 
possible paths where the disinflation programme leads to a decline in the level of 
dollarisation. The thick line depicts the case in which the adjustment programme is 
successful in driving out the foreign currency, that is,  () 1 = t m . The thin line 
represents a case in which some dollarisation remains at the end of the adjustment 
programme. In both cases the demand for domestic money rises along the adjustment 
period, implying an inflation rate lower than the rate of money creation and equal to 
the foreign inflation rate, as required by the non-arbitrage condition. Since in the thin 13 
 
line case the cash switching is smaller, the inflation adjustment starts later and the 
adjustment period is shorter ( ) ~ ' ~ t t > 3.  
In panel (b) we depict the case in which the disinflation programme does not at 
all reduce the dollarisation level. In this case,  () m t m = , implying  t t ~ =  and the 
inflation rate is always equal to the rate of money growth.  
Note that in the extreme case depicted by the thick line in panel (a) domestic 
inflation adjusts once-and-for-all at moment % t , while the demand for foreign 
currency declines smoothly until moment t . In all the other cases some dollarisation 
remains, despite the success of the anti-inflation policy. In all cases the demand for 
foreign currency fails to respond linearly to changes in the inflation rate, which is in 
accordance to the empirical evidence.  
A planner would, if possible, choose the equilibrium path leading to m=1, 
because in that case all seigniorage revenues would accrue to the domestic economy. 
However, in a decentralised economy, there is no way of assuring that this 
equilibrium will occur4. 
                                                 
3 Obviously, results similar to those discussed in corollaries 1 and 2 apply for each equilibrium 
path of Proposition 2.  
4 Obviously, any small barrier to change, such a lump sum switching cost, would favour the 
non-reversibility outcome, depicted in panel (b). 14 
 
Obviously, the indeterminacy holds only when the disinflation programme 
reduces the rate of money growth exactly to the level of foreign inflation. However, 
in Appendix 3 it is shown that, with network externalities, such indeterminacy is 
extended to a range of money supply paths. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we analyse the behaviour of money demand and inflation in a 
small open economy where a domestic and a foreign currency are perfect substitutes 
as means of payment. It is shown that, if the domestic money growth is such that 
currency substitution becomes optimal from the individual point of view, there will 
be an adjustment period during which the domestic inflation adjusts to equal the 
foreign inflation rate. The length of the adjustment period depends on the rate of 
money growth and the minimum allowed level of domestic money holdings. In the 
case of a disinflation programme, it is shown that the economy does not necessarily 
return to the single-currency regime, despite that being the superior outcome in terms 
of aggregate welfare. The model captures the different patterns of dollarisation 
identified in the literature, namely reversibility in some cases and non-reversibility in 
others, without requiring the specification of dollarisation costs.  15 
 
Appendix 1  
The lifetime utility of the representative individual is given by  
Uu c e d t t
rt =
∞ − ∫ ()
0 ,                                                                                      (a1) 
where c denotes real consumption, r is the subjective rate of discount, and u is a 
well-behaved utility function.  
Individuals hold real wealth in the format of one international indexed bond, b, 
yielding a real return r and real money balances, m and f. In each moment in time 
individuals receive an exogenous real income, y, and a government transfer, τ. The 
change in real wealth is given by 
& ()
* wr b m f y c tt t t t t t =− − + +− ππ τ ,                                                         (a2) 
where  wbmf tt tt =++.  The foreign inflation rate and the real interest rate on the 
indexed bond are exogenous and assumed constant. Using (1), integrating over time 
and imposing the no Ponzi game condition limtt
rt we →∞
− = 0, we obtain the 
consumer's lifetime budget constraint:  





0 = − + + + − + +
− ∞ − ∞




t t t π π π τ .                (a3) 
The last term of (a3) shows that the individual real wealth depends on how 
much she gains (or looses) by shifting from the foreign inflation tax to the domestic 16 
 
inflation tax. It is also clear that the money demand path that achieves the highest 
consumption level is the one that maximises the last term, implying that the choice 
between currencies is separable from the saving-consumption decision.  
Each consumer maximises his utility function (a1) subject to (1), (2) and (a2), 
taking the inflation paths and government transfers as given. One first-order 
condition leads to:   
uc r tt ′=+ + () [ ]
* λπ 1                                                                                (a4) 
and the co-state dynamics is: 
& λt = 0.                                                                                                     (a5) 
Equation (a4) is the usual condition stating that the marginal utility of 
consumption divided by the shadow price of wealth is equal to the price of 
consumption, which is one plus the opportunity cost of money. The latter is 
measured in terms of the foreign currency, being the gains or losses associated to the 
use of domestic currency captured by the wealth effect in (a3). Since the real interest 
rate is equal to the rate of time preference, both the shadow price of wealth and the 
consumption level will be constant over time.  
Since the individual objective function is linear in m and (2) defines a closed 
control set, the resulting money demand for domestic currency is given by (3).   17 
 
To close the model, we assume that government consumption is zero and that 
seigniorage is the only source of revenue. We also impose a balanced budget 









.                                                                                       (a6) 
This restriction assures that domestic seigniorage has no income effects. 
However, when individuals make their decisions they take government transfers as 
given.  
The foreign seigniorage revenues are assumed to be appropriated by the 
foreign country. Using (4), (a2) and (a6) and integrating over time, we obtain the 
economy's inter-temporal resource constraint in real per capita terms: 












0 0 π ,                                                         (a7) 
where b0 and  f0 denote the initial real asset holdings. Equation (a7) says that, as long 
as domestic residents hold foreign money balances, they suffer from wealth erosion 
proportional to the amount of foreign currency being held. This implies a reduction 
in individual consumption and generates a current account imbalance. However, this 
imbalance only affects the consumption level, which remains constant over time, so 
that the results obtained do not depend on this wealth effect.  18 
 
Appendix 2  
To prove Proposition 1, let us first consider the problem starting at moment t . 
Since µ π t tt >∀ >
*, , by the same argument used for time-invariant paths of µ  in 
Definition 2, the unique solution of this problem is mm = . This gives the third line 
of (5). For the problem starting at moment zero, however, the solution cannot be 
mm =  up to t  for that would imply ππ <
*, which in turn would be inconsistent with 
the money demand. Hence, the solution up to time t  involves currency substitution. 
To find the equilibrium path of domestic money balances, we use the non-arbitrage 
condition ππ =







 − − − − =
2 2 *
2
exp ) ( t t t t t m t m
σ
µ π .                                              (a8) 
Using mt m () =  and the definition of t  in (a8), we obtain the second line of 
(5). To find % t  we simple observe that  ) ~ (t m =1 and the result is straightforward5. 
Finally, using (4) and (5), the inflation path given by (6) results immediately, 
implying that both money demand and supply are satisfied.  
                                                 
5 Note that  (5) is in accordance with both requirements of Definition 1. Indeed, it can be 
shown that  t t t t m m ~ ~ 1 lim = = − →  and  t t t t m m m = = − → lim , so that (5) is continuous over time. This 
fact, together with the observation that m decreases monotonically along the intermediate segment, 
assures the verification of (2). 19 
 
Appendix 3  
To show that how the indeterminacy is extended to a range of money supply 
paths, we introduce transaction costs associated to the level of dollarisation. 
Transactions involving agents using different currencies require some support 
activities, such as those that are normally required for international trade (for 
example, the effort involved in obtaining information on the relevant exchange rate, 
in dealing with foreign exchange traders and managing risk). These costs depend on 
the level of dollarisation and do not disappear with learning. 
In order to keep this note simple we postulate an ad hoc dollarisation costs 
function, g, with decreasing marginal costs6: 
() ) 1 ( f f f g − = δ .                                                                                     (a9) 
The marginal cost of dollarisation,  () f 2 1− δ , decreases with f and becomes 
negative after f>1/2 (that is when the foreign currency becomes more liquid than the 
domestic currency, the cost of reducing the use of the domestic currency is offset by 
                                                 
6 Dollarisation cost functions with different shapes were specified, for example, by 
Sturzenegger (1992), Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992), Chang (1993), Dowd and Greenaway (1993) 
and Uribe (1997). Reding and Morales (1999), on the other hand, incorporated an explicit model for 
the network effect.  20 
 
the advantage of rising the proportion of the more popular currency)7. Dollarisation 
costs are assumed to be paid by consumers in the proportion of their holdings of 
foreign currency (as a brokerage fee). Thus, the private cost will be the dollarisation 
cost per unit of foreign currency, denoted by α 8:  
αδ tt m = .                                                                                                  (a10) 

























.                                                                 (a11) 
An immediate implication of (a11) is that there exists a minimum inflation 
differential, α, below which dollarisation does not occur.  
Given (a11), for time-invariant paths of µ, the equilibrium paths of m are:   
m=1 if µ πδ <+
* m;                                                                                   (a12) 
mm =  if µ π δ >+
*  ;                                                                                  (a13) 
                                                 
7 This is the standard natural monopoly argument. An equivalent assumption is of identical and 
concave total transaction costs functions per currency, that is,  () () f h m h =  with  0 '> h  and  0 ' ' < h . 
Since  m f − =1 , the relevant extra cost due to dollarisation would be equivalent to (a9).  
8 Since this cost is not defined at the origin, we set it equal to its limit, which is the marginal 
cost (individuals perceive the cost of an incipient dollarisation). 21 
 
δ π µ δ π
δ
π π













m if m m .                              (a14) 
Cases (a12)-(a14) are depicted in Figure A1. In case (a12), the domestic 
inflation is lower than the user cost associated to an incipient amount of foreign 
currency, which is (π δ
* + ). Hence, m=1 is an equilibrium solution. Furthermore, 
since  m δ π π + <
*  no other dollarisation level satisfies the money demand. Similar 
comments are valid for case (a13).  
Case (a14) compares to line (iii) of Definition 2. With dollarisation costs, 
however, there is an entire range of steady state money supply paths 
( δ π µ δ π + ≤ ≤ +
* * m ) for which the indeterminacy occurs.  
The effects of unexpected shifts on the monetary policy are straightforward in 
light of Figure 39. For example, if initially m=1 and then the rate of money growth 
unexpectedly shifts once-and-for-all from µ π δ ≤+
*  to  δ π µ + >
* , then the price 
                                                 
9 Obviously, with dollarisation costs, the perfect foresight dynamics is more complex. Since 
the dynamics properties obtained in Section 3 depend only on the PMS assumption, they should not 
be affected by the introduction of costs associated to the dollarisation level. The only predictable 
difference is that the equality between opportunity costs during the adjustment period would be 
consistent with an inflation differential. Since there are no reasons to expect any important novelties 
in the non-linear case, we avoid the mathematical complications by discussing only equilibria with 
time invariant paths of µ.  22 
 
level will jump so as to reduce the real money balances from m=1 to mm = .  On the 
other hand, if the rate of money growth unexpectedly shifts once-and-for-all from 
δ π µ + >
* , to  δ π µ δ π + ≤ ≤ +
* * m , then the price level becomes undetermined 
and any dollarisation levels may occur in the steady state. Thus, a rate of money 
creation equal to the one verified previously to dollarisation is not a sufficient 
condition for the return to a single currency regime, despite that being the superior 
outcome in terms of welfare (note that, with dollarisation costs, the welfare loss 
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